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INTRODUCTION
This study aims at providing the empirical evidence
of the influence of accounting standards on earnings
management behavior. The main underlying issue in
this research is the idea that accounting standards
cannot limit earnings management behavior.
Tightening accounting standards reduces earnings
management through judgments, but increases
opportunities for earnings management through
transaction structure. On the other hand, a flexible
accounting standard reduces earnings management
through transaction structuring but increases
opportunities for earnings management through
judgments (Nelson, 2003).
Researches on different types of accounting
standards have been subject of interest to the
academia.  Nisbet (2007) compared rule-based versus
principle-based accounting standards across eight
countries that reported accounting scandals. The
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result shows that during five year period of 2001 to
2005, accounting scandals at 38 companies became
public knowledge under the U.S. rules-based GAAP
system as compared to only 12 companies under the
more principles-based IFRS system. Thus, during the
period 2001 to 2005, more than three times as many
accounting scandals were reported in the U.S. than in
principles-based jurisdictions. Maybe, this is one of
accounting standards failures that led the profession
to call for a change. This change have centered on a
shift from a rule-based accounting to a principle-based
accounting system. In addition, Section 108 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 instructed the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) to conduct a study
on adoption of a principle-based accounting system.
As part of this study, the Financial Accounting
Standards Board (FASB) developed a “Proposal for a
Principle-Based Approach to U.S. Standard Setting.”
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Is it the best decision? It is still debatable and it needs
further studies. Kusuma (2007) suggests that principle-
based approach have difficulties to implement, because
it does not have a complete guidance to apply the
standards.
Since reported earnings are the results of the
underlying business operations and accounting choice
that record the transactions, firms may manage
earnings through manipulation of the accrual and real
activities. The extant literature presents substantial
evidence that firms use accruals and real earnings
management to manage earnings. Since accruals
management is less costly than manipulation of real
business activities, accruals manipulation may be a
more preferable tool of earnings management than
manipulation of real business activities. However,
accruals earnings management becomes more difficult
when manager faces constraints in their ability to inflate
earnings through the use of accruals.
This study contributes to the subject in several
ways. First, this study provides the  empirical evidence
for analytical model developed by Ewert and
Wagenhofer (2005). Second, this study  enhances the
understanding about effectiveness of accounting
standards in constrainting earnings management
intentional behaviour.
Literature Review
There are two types of approach in accounting
standards setting: rule-based accounting standards
and principle-based accounting standards (Psaraos
and Trotman, 2004). Nelson (2003) defines “rules”
broadly include specific criteria, “bright line”
thresholds, examples, scope restrictions, exceptions,
subsequent precedents, implementation guide, etc.
Rule-based accounting standards provide detail rules
for application of standards. It cause foster an alleged
current “check-box” or compliance mentality (Schipper,
2003). Tweedie (Head of IASB) calls rule-based
standards as “the cookbook approach”. This idea is
contrasted with principle-based standards that suggest
an attempt to tell preparer and auditor not what to do,
but how to decide on what  needs to be done
(Alexander, 2006).
Increasing detail and complexity of the U.S Generally
Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) have been
attributed to a rules-based contrast with International
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) that reflects
principles-based approach to standard setting.
Australia, England, New Zealand and Germany also
use principle-based approach in standard setting
(Bennet et al., 2006; Benston et al., 2006). This study
focuses on The U.S. that represents rule-based
accounting standards and Germany that represents
principle-based accounting standards.
An example of rule-based accounting standards on
US GAAP is Statement of Financial Accounting
Standards (SFAS) 13, Accounting for Lease. This
standard provides a detailed list of criteria for lease
classification containing several bright-line thresholds.
In developing SFAS 13, FASB had hoped that explicit
lease classification rules would eliminate individual
judgment, resulting consistent application of the
standards across firms (Shortridge and Marying, 2004).
However, because bright-line tests were established,
companies have been able to structure and interpret
lease contracts to avoid capitalization, which tends to
present a more favorable picture of a company’s overall
financial condition (Imhoff and Thomas 1988).
In 1988, alleviation law regarding raising of capital
was enacted to improve the competitiveness of German
companies (Delvaille et al., 2005). This allow companies
with listed shares to prepare consolidated statements
according to internationally accepted accounting
standards, namely IAS or U.S GAAP. However, the
option to prepare consolidated reports in conformity
with U.S. GAAP or IAS introduced Anglo-American
principles into German accounting. these principles
differ significantly from Germany’s accounting model
that focuses on creditor protection and the principle
of prudence. In contrast, the Anglo-American standards
focus on providing shareholder information with the
‘substance over form’ approach that requires extensive
use of professional judgements (Fischer et al., 2004).
The step towards international convergence was
the so-called European IAS regulation, which required
capital-market orientated companies to prepare
consolidated financial reports consistent with IAS/
IFRS (Council, 2002). This obligation became effective
for reports of financial years beginning on or after the
1st of January 2005.
The extant accounting research encompasses both
accruals management and manipulation of underlying
real business. The most commonly studied method is
accrual management (Jones, 1991; Healy and Wahlen,
1999). Accrual earnings management occurs when
management manipulates reported earnings by
exploiting the accounting discretion allowed under
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GAAP (Healy and Wahlen, 1999).  In contrast, real
earnings management occurs when management
changes the timing or structuring of real business
transaction to alter earnings, implying that the change
of real transactions deviates from optimal plan of
action and thus imposes a real cost to the firm (Ewert
and Wagenhofer, 2005).
Techniques used in real earnings management are
sales manipulation, overproduction, and reduction of
discretionary expenditures. (Roychowdhury, 2006).
Sales manipulation occurs when managers attempt to
temporarily increase sales during the year to beat
earnings target. This is done by offering price
discounts of more lenient credit terms. One way
managers can generate additional sales or accelerate
sales from the next fiscal year into the current year is
by offering ‘limited-time’ price discounts. Another way
to boost sales volumes temporarily to increase
earnings is to offer more lenient credit terms. For
example, retailers and automobile manufacturers often
offer lower interest rates (zero-percent financing)
toward the end of their fiscal years. These are
essentially price discounts and lead to lower cash
inflow over the life of the sales, as long as suppliers
to the firm do not offer matching discounts on firm
inputs. This sales manipulation can lead to lower
current-period chief financial officer (CFO) and higher
production costs than normal sales level.
The other technique is overproduction. Manager
in manufacturing firms can produce excessive goods
to meet expected demand. Excessive production can
reduce fixed cost per unit by spreading fixed overhead
cost over large number of units. These implies that
cost of good sold is lower and firm reports higher
operating margin. Thomas and Zhang (2002) find that
firms produce excessive goods to inflate reported
earnings.
To inflate earnings or avoid loss, managers can
reduce reported discretionary expenditures. These
discretionary expenditure are, for example, research
and development (R&D), sales,  general and
administrative (SG&A) expense. Reducing such
expense will inflate current period earnings. It could
also lead to higher current period cash flows (at the
risk of lower future cash flow) if the firm generally
paid for such expense in cash (Cohen et al., 2008).
Principle-based accounting standards use broad
guidelines that are based on underlying principle.
These standards require more professional judgment.
There is still controversial that principle-based
accounting standards create greater potential for
earnings management. Some fear that if financial
statement preparers and auditors feel unconstrained
by clearly defined rules, they are unlikely to follow even
broader principles (Yu, 2008). Consequently, U.S. GAAP
has become much more details-oriented and stringent.
However, many of accounting scandals that happen in
the US raises big question about rule-based accounting
standards. Many professionals feel that standard setter
(FASB) or regulator in the US are too confident about
the standards. Tightened accounting standards can
reduce accrual-based earnings management, but
increase earnings management through real activities
manipulation. Some studies support this argument.
Demski (2004) models a substitution effect between
accrual earnings management and real earnings
management. He assumes that tightened accounting
standards can reduce accrual-based earnings
management, but increase earnings management
through real activities manipulation. Ewert and
Wagenhofer (2005) model shows the consequences of
tighter accounting standards on firms’ earnings
management activities. They show that in a rational
expectation equilibrium, tighter accounting standards
restrict management’s discretion to manipulate
accruals, and at the same time, induce more costly real
earnings management activities. As a result, the
magnitude of total earnings management does not
decrease with the tightening of accounting standards.
Cohen et al. (2008), support these argument. They
show that pre-SOX period (more flexible accounting
standards) is characterized by high accrual earnings
management and low real earnings management. Their
findings suggest that after the passage of SOX, firms
are likely to have partially switched from accrual earnings
management to real earnings management because of
increased regulatory scrutiny and litigation risk.
Prior studies (Demski, 2004; Ewert and Wagenhofer,
2005; Cohen et al., 2008; Yu, 2008) show that accounting
standards have implication on earnings management
behaviour. Principle-based system creates greater
potential for earnings management because it gives
preparer broder room to exercise professional judgment
in areas involving accounting estimates, uncertainties,
and inherent subjectivity. As long as managers can
use these discretion, they will choose accrual earnings
management rather than real earnings management. Real
earnings management is costly for firms because it has
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real economic impact. Germany uses principle-based
approach in accounting standard-setting, while The
U.S. uses rule-based approach. Thus, the following
hypothesis regarding the relation between the
accounting standard and earnings management stated
as follows:
H1: Accrual earnings management in Germany is
higher than in the U.S.
The first hypothesis predicts that as long as
principle-based accounting standards provide broader
room for manager to use accounting discretion,
manager will choose accrual earnings management
rather than real earnings management. The SEC study
recognizes that a rule-based approach intentionally
minimizes accounting judgment by establishing fine,
articulated rules that attempt to anticipate all possible
application. Rules-based accounting standards provide
more precise accounting standards, resulting in less
room to manipulate financial numbers through
accounting treatment. In a rational expectation
equilibrium,  precise accounting standards restricts
management’s discretion to manipulate accruals,  and
at the same time, induces more costly real earnings
management activities. Therefore, the second
hypothesis is as follows:
H2: Real earnings management in the U.S. is higher
than in Germany
Research  Objectives
Research objectives in this paper are as follow:
1- To find out whether the accrual earnings management
in Germany is higher than the  U.S?
2- To find out whetherthe real earnings management in
the U.S is higher than  Germany?
Resea rch  Qu es t ions
Research questions in this paper are as follow:
1- Is the accrual earnings management in Germany
higher than the U.S?
2- Is the real earnings management in the U.S higher
than Germany?
RESEARCH  METHOD
Consistent with observations made in Schipper
(2003), we chose a U.S. standard to represent the
purported rules-based approach to standard setting
and a Germany standard (HGB) and IFRS to represent a
principles-based approach (We choose Germany firms
because the raw data section of OSIRIS contain detailed
data, which is taken directly from the companies’
annual reports. The data is as reported in annual reports
and has not been standardized, adjusted, or rounded
(Glaum et al., 2004)).
Our data is obtained from the OSIRIS financial
database for the period 2004-2007. We restrict our
sample to all manufacturing firms (2-digit NAICS 2007
Primary Code: 31-33) with available data, and require
at least 4 observations in each 2-digit SIC grouping
per year. Further, we require that each firm-year
observation has the data necessary to calculate the
discretionary accruals metrics and real earnings
management proxies we use in our analysis.
Osiris database consists of 9,158 and 887 firms for
the U.S. and Germany. Requir ing data for
manufacturing firms reduces the sample to  1,107 and
213 firms for the  U.S. and Germany. We eliminated 13
German firms that use the  U.S. GAAP. Outlier data
also excluded from the sample. Imposing all the data-
availability requirements yields 1,097 and 198 firm-years
for the  U.S. and Germany (including 13 industries and
1,295 firms). Table 1 provide sample selection process.
Table 2 provides sample distribution according to
country and industry.
Measures of  Ea rning s Ma na gement
A. Accrual-based Earnings Management
We used modified Jones model to separate
discretionary and non-discretionary earnings
component (Dechow et al., 1995). The modified Jones
model is estimated for each two-digit SIC-year
grouping. Total accruals (TACC) are measured as the
difference between net income before extraordinary
item and cash flows from operating activities for current
period in year t; that is,
To estimated discretionary accruals from firm i in year
t, we first estimate parameter  for each two-digit SIC-
year grouping as follows,
The coefficient estimates from equation  (2) are used
to estimate firm-specific normal accruals (NDACC) for
our sample firms:
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Total firms No Criteria 
U.S. Germany 
1 Total Public Firms 18,309 1,349 
2 Public firms that available in OSIRIS database 9,158 887 
3 Manufacturing firms according to NAICS 2007 (Primary Code: 31-33) 2,912 341 
4 
Exclude from the sample because: 
a. Data uncomplete 
b. Germanys’ firms that use U.S. GAAP 
c. Outlier Data 
(1,805) 
 
 
(10) 
(128) 
(13) 
 
(2) 
5 Final Sample 1,097 198 
       
 
Table 1: Sample selection process
Panel A: Sample distribution according to country     
Country Firms Observations   
  United States (US) 1,097 4,388  
  Germany (DE) 198 792   
      Total 1,295 5,180   
Panel B: Sample distribution according to industrya  
Industry US Germany Total 
  Food and Kindred Products 62 17 79 
  Textile Mill Products 28 17 45 
  Wood and Furniture 25 0 25 
  Paper and Printing 28 0 28 
  Chemicals and Allied Products 138 27 165 
  Rubber, Plastics and Glass Product 25 16 42 
  Leather Products 27 0 27 
  Primary Metal Industry 69 49 118 
  Machinery and Computer Equipment 150 0 150 
  Electric and Other Electrical Equipment 252 31 284 
  Transportation Equipment 62 19 81 
  Laboratory, Photographic and Medical 203 22 227 
  Miscellaneous Manufacturing Industry  28 0 29 
      Total 1,097 198 1,295 
a  Based on two-digit SIC Primary Code 
 
Tabel 2: Sample distribution according to country and industries
Discretionary accruals (DACC) for firm i year t equal:
where :
DACC = Discretionary Accruals
NDACC  = Non Discretionary Accruals
TACC = Total Accruals
EBXT = Earnings before extraordinary item and tax
CFO = Operating cash flow (from continuing operations)
TA = Total Assets
∆REV = Change in revenue from preceding year
PPE = Gross value of property, plant, and equipment
∆REC = Change in account receivable
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B. Real-based Earnings Ma nagement
Following the prior studies on real activities
manipulation (e.g., Roychowdhury, 2006; Cohen et al.,
2008), we consider the abnormal levels of cash flow
from operations (CFO), discretionary expenses and
production costs to study the level real activities
manipulation.
First, we use Roychowdhury’s (2006) model to
estimate the normal level of CFO. The normal level of
CFO is expressed as a linear function of sales and
change in sales. To estimate this model, we run the
following cross-sectional regression for each industry
and year (5):
For every firm-year, abnormal cash flow from
operations (R_CFO) is the difference between the actual
CFO and the expected CFO calculated using the
corresponding industry-year model.
For another type of real activities manipulation is
overproduction. We use Roychowdhury’s (2006) model
to estimate the normal level of production costs (6):
Production costs (Prod) are defined as the sum of
COGS and change in inventory during the year. For
every firm-year, abnormal production (R_Prod) cost is
the difference between the actual production costs and
the expected production costs calculated using the
corresponding industry-year model.
The third type of real activities manipulation is the
reduction of discretionary expenses. If managers
reduce discretionary expenditures (e.g., R&D expenses)
to boost earnings to the targets, abnormally low
discretionary expenses are expected. Following
Roychowdhury (2006), we estimate the normal level of
discretionary expenses (DiscExp) using the equation
below:
For every firm-year, abnormal discretionary
(R_DEX) expenditure is the difference between the
actual discretionary expenses and the expected
discretionary expenses calculated using the
corresponding industry-year model.
In order to capture the effect of real earnings
management through all these three variables in a
comprehensive measure, we combine the three
individual real earnings management variables.
64
Consistent with Cohen and Zarowin (2008), we multiply
R_CFO and R_DEX by negative one (-1) so the higher
the amount of R_CFO and R_DEX, the more likely it is
that the firm is engaging in sales manipulations through
price discounts and cutting discretionary expenses.
We do not multiply R_PROD by negative one since
higher production costs, as noted earlier, is indicative
of overproduction to reduce cost of goods sold. Our
combined measure, RM_PROXY is the sum of the above
standardized variables, R_CFO, R_PROD and R_DEX.
RESULTS AND DISSCUSSION
Table 3 shows descriptive statistic of companies
from the U.S. and Germany in overall (pooled data) at
2004-2007 periods. Table 3 shows that the average
mean value of accrual earnings management in
Germany (0.49969) is higher than earnings
management in The U.S (0.10842). This view showed
by average mean values of accrual earnings
management in Germany and The U.S. are 0.49969
and 0.10842. The absolute median of earnings
management in Germany is also higher than the
median in The U.S, which is 0.1654 for Germany and
0.06323 for The U.S. This study use absolute value of
accrual earnings management since there is neither
sight of direction nor earnings management motive
to formulate the hypothesis.
Each of three proxies of real earnings management
(abnormal cash flow operation, abnormal production
cost, and abnormal discretionary expenses) has
different direction. The proxies of R_CFO and R_DEX
have negative direction. It shows that the lower of its
value (the more negative), the higher earnings
management is conducted. Proxy of R_Prod has
positive direction, which means that the higher of its
value (the more positive), the higher earnings
management is conducted. From Table 3, it is obvious
that the average mean value of those three proxies of
real earnings management in The U.S.  is higher than
that of Germany.
In order to obtain sufficient and comprehensive
measurement concerning those three proxies of real
earnings management, hence, this study uses REM
variable that formed as the amount of standardized
variable of R_CFO, R_Prod, and R_DEX. Before
those three of them counted as total, particularly
for R_CFO and R_DEX variables must be times with
-1 since these two variables have negative directions
(Cohen et al., 2008).
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The US: Full Sample, 2004-2007 (n = 4.388) 
  Mean  Median  Std. Dev  Min.  Max. 
 
 AM_Abs 0.10842  0.06323  0.17479  0.00001  4.02255  
 R_CFO -0.23598  -0.17789  0.42421  -7.32870  2.45865  
 R_Prod -0.13005  -0.13990  0.37895  -2.69586  7.98527  
 R_DEX -0.05935  -0.0556  0.44132  -1.72764  1.36100  
 REM 0.16527  0.0854  0.77175  -1.21275  1.53068  
  
Germany: Full Sample, 2004-2007 (n = 792) 
 
  Mean  Median  Std. Dev  Min.  Max. 
 
 AM_Abs 0.49969  0.1654  0.7863  0.0005  6.8351 
 
 R_CFO -0.00814  -0.0264  0.5506  -5.5191  3.8711 
 
 R_Prod -0.41733  -0.3822  0.3503  -3.2921  2.6933 
 
 R_DEX 0.09359  0.0873  0.3067  -1.4399  2.5323 
 
 REM -0.50279  -0.4562  0.8542  -9.6956  8.4239 
 
                      
 
 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics
Variable  Definitions
AM_Abs = the absolute value ofdiscretionary accruals computed using  Modified Jones Model
R_CFO = the level of abnormal cash flow from operation
R_Prod = the level of abnormal production cost, where production costs are defined as the sum of cost of goods sold and the
change in inventories
R_DEX = the level of abnormaldiscretionary expenses (R&D expenses)
REM = the sum of standardized three real earnings management proxies, i.e., R_CFO, R_Prod, R_DEX
Result of  First Hypothesis  Test
Test of the first hypothesis intends to answer the
question whether accrual earnings management
conducted by companies in Germany is higher than
accrual earnings management conducted by companies
in the U.S. Test of the first hypothesis is carried out by
comparing mean value of discretionary accrual (proxy
of accrual earnings management) between companies
in Germany with companies cited in the U.S.
Table 4 shows that discretionary accrual in Germany
(0.4887) is higher than discretionary accrual in the U.S.
(0.1084). The t-test result showed the t value is -13,942
with value of p=0.000. This indicates that in the periods
of 2004-2007, accrual earnings management between
companies in Germany is different than companies in
The U.S. The discretionary accrual in Germany is higher
than discretionary accrual in The U.S. Therefore, the
first hypothesis which states that accrual earnings
management on companies in Germany is higher than
accrual earnings management in the US is supported
at the conventional level (1 %).
The result from the first hypothesis probably
indicates that approach of the rule-based accounting
standards used by the US is capable of reducing the
practices of accrual earnings management. This matter
is reflected from the lower value of companies’ accrual
discretionary in The U.S. as compared to companies in
Germany that used the principle-based accounting
standards approach. The approach of rule-based
accounting standards has made accounting standards
in the U.S. structured str ictly and decreases
opportunities of companies to conduct accrual
earnings management. This supports the first
hypothesis and is consistent with the results by
Demski (2004), Ewert and Wagenhofer (2005), Cohen
et al. (2008) and Yu (2008).
Result  of  Secon d Hyp oth esis Test
The second hypothesis intends to examine whether
real earnings management in the US is higher than those
in Germany. The second hypothesis test was performed
by conducting comparison of the average mean value
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of real earnings management between companies in the
US and companies located in Germany. Table 5 presents
summary result of the second hypothesis test.
Table 5 shows that the rate of companies’ real earnings
management in the US is 0.1653 higher than companies’
real earnings management in Germany that is -0.5028.
The result of t-test showed that t value is 22.046 (p=0.00).
This finding indicates that the real earnings management
happened in the U.S. at 2004-2007 periods are different
from the companies in Germany. This difference is
concerning to the manipulation over real activity
performed by companies in the U.S. is higher than
manipulation over real activity in Germany companies.
Hence, the second hypothesis stated that real earnings
management of companies in the U.S. is higher than real
earnings management of companies in Germany is
supported at 1% level.
The result of second hypothesis probably indicate
that the tight accounting standards through rule-based
accounting standards approach used by the US causes
higher real earnings management practices as compared
to the level of earnings management exposures in
Germany, which use sprinciple-based accounting
standards approach. The result of second hypothesis
is consistent with results by Demski (2004), Ewert and
Wagenhofer (2005), Cohen et al. (2008) and Yu (2008).
The tests of each proxy of real earnings management
also demonstrate a consistent result with the test of
REM variable, thus, the results showed that t-test result
values are -11,461 for R_CFO, 3.563 for R_Prod, and
-7.686 for R_DEX with probability of 0.000. See table 6.
The test towards each proxies of real earnings
management showed a consistent result with the test of
REM proxy. The mean of R_CFO proxy in the US
(-0.2359) is lower than in Germany (0.0081). The
lower (negative) value of R_CFO indicates that the
higher companies conducted earnings management
through sales manipulation. The test of independent-
samples t test by assumption of different population
variance showed the mean difference of R_CFO in The
U.S. and Germany is significant at the 1% level. This is
showing that the level of real earnings management
through sales manipulation in the U.S. is higher than
real earnings management via sales manipulation in
Germany.
The average mean for R_Prod proxy in the U.S. is
also higher than Germany that is -0.1300 for The U.S.
and -0.4173 for Germany. The higher (positive) value of
R_Prod indicates the higher companies conducted
earnings management through overproduction. The test
of independent-samples t test showed the mean
difference of R_Prod in the U.S. and Germany is
significant at the level of á=1%. This demonstrates that
the level of real earnings management through
overproduction in the the U.S. is higher than what
happened in Germany.
The average mean of R_DEX proxy in The U.S. is
also lower than Germany that is -0.0593 for the U.S. and
0.0936 for Germany. The lower (negative) value of
R_DEX indicates the higher companies conducted
earnings management by means of cutting off
discretionary expenses (SG&A and R&D). The test of
independent-samples t test(1-tailed) by assumption of
equal population variance showed the mean difference
R_DEX in the U.S. and Germany is significant at the 1%
level. This is showing that the level of real earnings
management by means of cutting off discretionary
expenses (SG&A and R&D) in the U.S. is higher than
in Germany.
Explanation Value 
Mean for absolute value of discretionary 
accruals: Germany 0.4887 
Mean for absolute value of discretionary 
accruals: U.S. 0.1084 
T test for difference -13.942 
Probability of T-test(1-tailed) 0.000 
 
Explanation Value 
Mean for absolute value of real earnings 
management: U.S. 0.1653 
Mean for absolute value of real earnings 
management: Germany -0.5028 
T test 22.046 
Probability of T-test(1-tailed) 0.000 
 
Mean T test 
probability REM 
proxy U.S Germany 
T test for 
difference 
(1-tailed) 
  R_CFO -0.2359 0.0081 -11.067 0.000 
  R_Prod -0.1300 -0.4173 19.858 0.000 
  R_DEX -0.0593 0.0936 -11.974 0.000 
 
Table 6: Results for each proxy of real earnings managementTable 4: Independent sample T-test for first hypothesis test
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Table 5: Independent sample T-test for second hypothesis test
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Sen sit ivi t y An alys is
Sensitivity analysis is conducted in order to
emphasize the research result conducted before. The
linear regression used in order to re-examine both
research hypothesis. Leverage and size of the company
are used as the controlling variables. Linear regression
used is Weighted Least-Square (WLS) model since this
model accelerates solutions for the occurrence of
heteroscedasticity. The model will divides all data by
prediction value of Y (Gujarati, 1995).
The test result on the hypothesis concerning the
influence of accounting standards towards accrual
earnings management by company’s leverage and size
as controlling variables was shown in Table 7.
Table 7 shows the coefficient of country variable is
statistically significant at the 1% level. This probably
implies that a country’s accounting standards
statistically affects the level of accrual earnings
management. The country variable is a form of dummy
variable that is valued as 1 for the U.S. companies with
more firmly accounting standards (rule-based) and
valued as 0 for Germany’s companies with more loosen
accounting standards (principle-based). Table 7 is also
showing that the regression coefficient of country
variable is negative, which it means that the more firm
of its accounting standards the lower conduction of
accrual earnings management. On the contrary, the
more loosen of its accounting standards the higher
conduction of accrual earnings management. The test
result using WLS emphasized previous test conducted
with the independent-samples t test.
The test of linear regression with REM as dependent
variable uses WLS towards Hypothesis of the influence
of accounting standards on real earnings management
with leverage and size of the company as controlling
variable is presented in Table 8.
Table 8 suggests that the country variable is
statistically significant. It means that a country’s
accounting standards is affecting real earnings
management level statistically. Table 8 is also figuring
out that the regression coefficient of country variable
is positive, which mean that the more firmly of its
accounting standards the higher conduction of real
earnings management, and just the opposite. The WLS
emphasized previous test with the independent-
samples t test).
The WLS emphasizes assumption that the
accounting standards approach in one country, either
with rule-based or principle-based approaches, may
affect earnings management practices. The tighter of
accounting standards, thus, manager will have
preference of choosing earnings management action
through real activity manipulation even though this
intentional selection will cause higher expense for
company. On the contrary, the loose of the accounting
standards, thus, company will prefer to use accrual
earnings management.
CONCLUSION
This study provides appropriate evidence that accrual
earnings management in Germany is much higher than
accrual earnings management in the US. This result
probably indicates that tighter accounting standards
(rule-based) can reduce accrual earnings management
practices. This supported hypothesis  is consistent with
the studies conducted by Demski (2004), Ewert and
Wagenhofer (2005), Cohen et al. (2008) and Yu (2008).
This study also suggests that real earnings
management conducted by companies in the US is
higher as compared with real earnings management
conducted by companies in Germany. This probably
occur since firm accounting standards will cut down
space of companies’ intentions in conducting accrual
earnings management, so that companies in the US will
conducts earnings management by manipulation of real
activity even if it costs higher expenses for the
companies.
Finally, it can be concluded that as long as accounting
standards provides spaces for companies to perform
judgment, thus, companies will prefer to practice earnings
management by using accrual manipulation. The rule-
based accounting standards will restrict companies to
Variabel Coefisient Std. Error t-test Sig 
(Constant) 0.455 0.018 25.803 0.000 
Country -0.413 0.017 -24.927 0.000 
Lev 0.135 0.015 9.187 0.000 
Size -3.382 0.783 -4.315 0.000 
 
Table 7: Result of WLS test for first hypothesis
Dependent variable: AM_abs
Variabel Coefisient Std. Error t-test Sig 
(Constant) -0.652 0.034 -19.153 0.000 
Country 0.735 0.032 23.006 0.000 
Lev 0.165 0.028 5.807 0.000 
Size 4.034 1.511 2.669 0.008 
 
Table 8: Result of WLS test for second hypothesis
Dependent variable: REM
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perform accrual earnings management; so that the
selection for  companies to perform earnings
management will shift to earnings management via real
activity manipulation even if it costs higher expenses
for the companies itself.
First, this research use sample from two different
countries. Thus, there are possibilities that there are a
lot of other influencing factors, besides accounting
standards differences, which may affects earnings
management practices. Second, the limited data that
available for processing in this research may have
affected the result so that the researcher addresses
assumption that the result of this research should be
interpreted carefully.
This study does not examine other factors that
probably affect the earnings management intentional
behavior. The future research may include other factors
having possibilities of affecting earnings management
behavior. Because of the small number of sample and
limitation of data in this study, thus, the researchers
suggest re-examining the issue in the future with larger
sample and longer observation periods. The future
study is suggested to have comprehensive view the
influence of the firm or loose concerning the accounting
standards by conducting experimental study. The
experimental study is expected to have fervent and
forceful impact to limit the influence of other factors
affecting earnings management practices. The next
study is also suggested to have larger view of whether
if there is a trade-off underlies between accrual earnings
management and real earnings management.
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